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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE
Introduction
I am deeply honored that John D. Feerick invited me to come back to Fordham University School of Law and appear in this
splendid conference. Yet I hasten to say that, when it comes to presidential succession, John Feerick and Joel K. Goldstein
are tough acts to follow. Indeed, in an otherwise wonderfully organized conference, the line of succession here is flawed. I
suppose I should declare myself unqualified to follow these experts on presidential succession! I shall bring the perspective of
the constitutional theory generalist to bear on the questions framed for our panel.
In thinking about the adequacy of the presidential succession system in the twenty-first century, we might take either of two
routes: (1) try to design an ideal system, given the kinds of problems we can imagine, and given our basic constitutional
commitments and aspirations, or (2) attempt to work with the system we have, tweaking it in politically feasible ways to make
it better, given an understanding of politics as the art of the possible. If I were to take the first approach, I could hardly do better
than the Continuity of Government Commission has done in its Second Report. 1 I would simply move for the adoption of
their recommendations. I suppose, though, that doing so would make for a boring paper--even if John C. Fortier and Norman
J. Ornstein, both on the Commission and here at the conference, would find it gratifying.
Instead, I am going to take the second approach. I shall put on my political scientist hat and think about what is politically
feasible from where we sit. In thinking about feasible reforms, we must begin with the sobering reality that a people who did
not abolish or amend the Electoral College after the Bush-Gore presidential election controversy is not likely to adopt *952
recommendations like those in the Continuity of Government Commission Report. We got the Twenty-Fifth Amendment only
after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, itself after a previous elderly President Dwight Eisenhower had serious
medical problems while in office. 2 We got the Twenty-Second Amendment only after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt

was elected to four terms. 3 We got the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 only after that same President died in office, early in

his fourth term. 4 And only after his successor, Harry S. Truman, lost control of both houses of Congress in the 1946 elections. 5
And so, I fear that we are not likely to adopt sound and sensible recommendations like those in the Continuity of Government
Commission Report until after a national catastrophe like those chillingly hypothesized in the opening pages of the Report. 6

Our panel is to consider “the adequacy of current succession law in light of the Constitution and policy considerations.” I

interpret “current succession law” to include both the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the Presidential Succession Act of 1947. 7
As for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which has been widely commended, I believe it is perfectly adequate in doing what it set
out to do. It does not resolve every conceivable problem, nor does it purport to do so. But what it addresses, it handles quite well.
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As for the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, which has been widely criticized, I am going to play devil's advocate and
defend it. I hasten to add that I am going to give only one and a half cheers for it as of 2010, though I would have given two
cheers for it in 1947. First, I shall defend it from a constitutional standpoint: both from a particular reading of who may be an
“Officer” within the meaning of the Succession Clause of Article II, Section 1of the Constitution and from a general conception
of separation of powers principles. Second, I shall defend it from the standpoint of policy. I shall present President Truman's
policy arguments in support of the Act and acknowledge the good in them. But, like Goldstein, I will point to changes in our
politics since 1947 that somewhat undercut the wisdom of Truman's arguments. 8
I. One and a Half Cheers for the Presidential Succession Act of 1947
The literature on presidential succession has not been kind to the Presidential Succession Act of 1947: most commentators argue
that it is *953 both unconstitutional and unwise as a matter of policy. 9 Before assessing the Act's constitutionality, I want to
distinguish two competing general approaches to separation of powers questions. One is formalist, categorical, and hermetic. 10

The other is functionalist, flexible, and pragmatic. 11 In recent years, the former approach has been highly vocal, and we see
it most clearly in Justice Scalia's separation of powers jurisprudence and that of his acolytes, including Professor Steven G.
Calabresi. 12 Those who take this approach find the very idea of legislative succession to the Presidency repugnant to their
formalist, hermetic vision. 13 It is also a pox on their grand conception of a unitary executive. 14

By contrast, I take a pragmatic, flexible approach to separation of powers generally, and so I accord a great deal of deference
to practical arrangements worked out by the President and Congress. I believe, with Richard E. Neustadt and most political
scientists, that we do not have a system of pure “separation of powers,” but instead a system of “separated institutions sharing

powers.” 15 I am opposed to importing grand normative theories of the formalist separation of powers and the unitary executive
and imposing them upon such practical arrangements as presidential succession (or, for that matter, legislative vetoes, 16 line

item vetoes, 17 and the like). In recent years, I believe, the formalist approach has done great damage to the workings of our
political system, and it has underestimated the pragmatic complexities of the workings of the modern administrative state. This
approach underpins many arguments against the constitutionality of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947.
*954 By contrast, I develop my pragmatic, flexible approach to separation of powers from what our practice has been, not from
grand, normative formalist conceptions from on high. And I accord considerable deference concerning the constitutionality of
practices, like legislative succession, that have been in place since the early years of our constitutional system. 18 Therefore I see
no constitutional infirmity in legislative succession. And I relish the fact that, contrary to the so-called originalists' arguments
against the constitutionality of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, as Goldstein pointed out, the better originalist arguments
are in favor of the constitutionality of legislative succession. 19

Let us turn to the question of the meaning of the word “Officer” in the Succession Clause of the Constitution. 20 Article II,
Section 1 empowers Congress, in the absence of a functioning President or Vice President, to declare “what Officer” shall act

as President. 21 I read this clause to mean simply that Congress is empowered to declare who shall act as President, that is, who
shall succeed the President and Vice President. Whoever Congress designates shall, by virtue of that fact, be an officer. I realize
that much ink has been spilled on the question of whether an “Officer” must be an “Officer of the United States,” and whether
an “Officer” is a term of art referring to executive or judicial officers rather than legislative officers or indeed to only executive
officers. 22 I reject all of these arguments as driven by a misguided formalist conception of separation of powers.

I want to focus on the language of the Constitution and to interpret it in light of the pragmatic, flexible scheme of separation of
powers, together with checks and balances, established in our constitutional scheme. We should read the Constitution to make
sense as a matter of ordinary understanding. And, we should avoid readings that construe ordinary language like “Officers” as
terms of art. If we take this pragmatic approach, we will not be driven to artificial conclusions like saying that “Officers” means
only executive officers and that the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate are not “Officers” in a
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constitutional sense. An “Officer” is simply a person who holds an office. That would include the Speaker of the House and
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Indeed, an “Officer” could include the Governor of the most populous state (even if
an “Officer of the United States” would not). And it could include anyone named by the President to a group of advisors who

would be in the line of succession (to be recommended below). The fact that both Goldstein 23 and John Feerick 24 raise doubts
*955 about the conventional arguments against the Act's constitutionality bolsters my judgment that it is not unconstitutional.
As for the wisdom of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, I accord a considerable amount of deference to the judgment of
pragmatic presidents (and former senators) like Harry Truman over the judgment of formalist law professors. What is there to
be said for the Presidential Succession Act of 1947? Truman said two things. One, Truman did not believe that the President
should have the power to choose his own successor, and therefore favored legislative succession over cabinet succession. 25
That sounds sensible, to a point, though perhaps it sounds less sensible to us now than it seemed to him in 1947. Nowadays,
people are more enamored with the unitary executive and the imperial presidency than they were back in 1947. That may make
people more comfortable today with the idea that the President should be able to choose his successor, and less comfortable with
the idea of legislative succession. And nowadays, the President to a greater degree chooses her own successor to begin with
in selecting a vice presidential running mate; and so, perhaps, people would worry less about the fact that a President would
be naming her own successor farther down the line through nominating a cabinet. But, of course, the presidential nominee's
choice as a vice presidential running mate has to be confirmed by the delegates to the nominating convention and by the voters
in the election.
Two, Truman thought that the successors should be people who had been elected, rather than merely appointed, which argued
for legislative succession over cabinet succession. 26 Indeed, Truman argued that the Speaker of the House had a superior

electoral pedigree to everyone other than the President and Vice President. 27 Unlike many constitutional law scholars, I believe
that there is eminent practical wisdom here. Just as there is practical wisdom in the anecdote that when then-Vice President
Lyndon Johnson boasted to Speaker Samuel T. Rayburn about President John Kennedy's choosing “the best and the brightest”
for his Cabinet, Rayburn supposedly said he would feel more comfortable “if just one of them had run for sheriff once.” 28

Remarkably, some constitutional law scholars of today, like Calabresi, Akhil R. Amar, and Vikram D. Amar, 29 suggest that
cabinet officers have a greater democratic pedigree than do the leaders of the House and Senate! They emphasize that the
President is elected, and that the Senate advises and consents on presidential nominations for cabinet posts. But I daresay that
only a few law professors and champions of the unitary executive would say that this denotes that the Secretary of the *956
Treasury enjoys a superior democratic pedigree to the Speaker of the House!
I acknowledge that people today are more dubious about legislative succession because of the increasing prevalence of divided
government, making more likely the prospect of a change in party control of the Presidency through legislative succession. I also
believe that people today are more dubious about legislative succession because they are more disparaging toward legislatures
and legislators' capabilities in general. I have studied the disparagement of legislatures, and even organized a conference entitled
The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the Twenty-First Century. 30 I have never seen such disparagement
of Congress as in the literature on presidential succession! Except perhaps at the Tea Party gatherings! The only criticism I
have of the Continuity of Government Commission Report is that it unfairly disparages the capacities of members of the House
and Senate.

Truman had a third idea--special elections--with the consequence that legislative succession would be only an interim measure,

to be followed by the election of a President. 31 Unfortunately, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 did not adopt that
proposal. I advocate special elections below.

Thus, I conclude that legislative succession under the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 is not unconstitutional and that the
policy arguments in support of it are not as bad as is commonly thought. Now I turn to minor, feasible changes I would propose.
II. Proposed Minor, Feasible Changes to the Presidential Succession Act of 1947
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I would tweak the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 with three minor, feasible changes, all of which would leave legislative
succession in place, since I am assuming that Congress is unlikely to repeal this feature of the current arrangement. One, I would
change the legislative succession in a way that would avoid the potential transfer of power from one party to another: (1) instead
of the Speaker of the House, the successor would be the leader of the President's party in the House (whether it be the Speaker of
the House, the House Majority Leader, or the House Minority Leader) and (2) instead of President Pro Tempore of the Senate,
the successor would be the leader of the President's party in the Senate (whether it be the Senate Majority Leader or the Senate
Minority Leader). Both of these changes are more feasible than changing legislative succession to cabinet succession. And,
both avoid a transfer of power from one party to another through legislative succession.
Two, I would institute a vice Vice President or a body of successors appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
I think most commentators have given too short shrift to the idea of a vice Vice *957 President. For a time, it was hard even
to get highly capable people interested in the Vice Presidency. For example, John Nance Garner, Vice President under Franklin
Delano Roosevelt from 1933-1941, famously said the Vice Presidency was “not worth a pitcher of warm piss.” 32 That has
certainly changed, 33 but it still might be difficult to get highly qualified people interested in a vice Vice Presidency.

Who, you may ask, would want that office? Well, for starters, any former President or Vice President who is physically and
mentally capable of serving. For example, William J. Clinton and Albert A. Gore could stand in the line of succession after
Vice President Joseph R. Biden. And George W. Bush and Richard B. Cheney could do so under a Republican Presidency. I
realize that questions of disability might arise with very senior former presidents and vice presidents (e.g., George H.W. Bush in
advanced years or Ronald W. Reagan while he was alive but had Alzheimer's). I also acknowledge that questions of competence
might arise in some instances, for example, some might worry about having Dan Quayle in the line of succession. I also think
it would be good for these successors to be interim or acting presidents, with a special election to follow soon.
In my ideal line of succession, former presidents and vice presidents should come before either legislative leaders or cabinet
members. They have considerable relevant experience and knowledge. They typically have not returned to elective office. And
some of them live and work in places outside Washington, D.C. In my second-best line of succession, given the unlikelihood
that Congress will give up legislative succession, former presidents and vice presidents would come after legislative leaders
and before cabinet members.
Another possibility I would embrace is an idea put forward by Goldstein, for Congress to “create a number of new ‘officers”’
whose responsibility would be “simply [to] serve as wise men and women who would be briefed, who would be available
to advise the President and serve as contingent successors.” 34 The Continuity of Government Commission makes a similar

recommendation. 35 Both Goldstein and the Commission would place them after cabinet members in the line of succession. I
would place them before. I note that Goldstein and the Commission implicitly are assuming, as I do, that an “Officer” does not
have to be a sitting federal executive or judicial officer. I also would observe that Goldstein gives as examples not only former
presidents and vice presidents but also elder statesmen like William W. Bradley, John C. Danforth, and Colin L. Powell. Such
people, I daresay, would be willing to serve as vice Vice President in this sense, or as officers in a body of contingent successors.
*958 If we want people with executive experience in the line of succession, let us put the governors of the most populous
five states in the line of succession, provided that they are of the same party as the President. They also would have the benefit
of living and working outside Washington, D.C. Here, I should note that I disagree with the Amars that “Officers” must be
“Officers of the United States,” which excludes state officials. In any case, the President could name these governors to this
body and as such they would be “Officers.”
Finally, I would institute special elections, thus making all forms of succession (whether legislative, cabinet, or vice vice

presidential) temporary. This was the practice in the original statute, the Presidential Succession Act of 1792. 36 Truman argued

for special elections, 37 as does the Continuity of Government Commission, 38 and just about everyone else who has thought
about the matter. Everybody, that is, except the ones who have mattered thus far: the Republican Congress that adopted the
Presidential Succession Act of 1947.
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Footnotes
a1

Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, and Associate Dean for Research,
Boston University School of Law. I prepared this Essay for the symposium on The Adequacy of the Presidential
Succession System in the Twenty-First Century, held at Fordham University School of Law, April 16-17, 2010. From
1991 to 2007, I was a law professor at Fordham, and I want to thank John D. Feerick and the Fordham Law Review for
inviting me to come back to Fordham for the symposium and for their gracious hospitality on that occasion. I gratefully
acknowledge Jameson Rice of Boston University School of Law, Class of 2011, for his helpful research assistance.
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